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Louis Althusser’s recently translated book, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, is a more 
detailed treatment of the theory of ideology popularized in his essay, “Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation).” This essay, which 
is often an entry point for contemporary discussions about ideology and subjectivity, 
has made a significant mark on critical scholarship since its publication. Critical 
theorists have applied the concept of the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) to read 
and interpret the ways in which ideology contributes to the reproduction of power in 
society. In Media and Cultural Studies, for instance (my own field), Althusser’s concept 
of interpellation has provided a cogent model for understanding the reproduction 
of ideological hegemony in media spectatorship. Althusser famously claims that 
ideology interpellates individuals as subjects, and therefore his theory of ideology is 
tied together with his structural Marxist conception of subjectivity. 
In the new book, Althusser explains further that “subject” is a category of the law, 
but also of legal ideological discourse.1 “Subject,” as we know from the original essay, is 
a strictly ideological category for Althusser, but in the new book he shows how it serves 
the reproduction of the capitalist relations of production through its inclusion in the 
form of the bourgeois law and by being supplemented in the “moral” code of the legal 
ideology. For instance, as he puts it, “Law says: individuals are legal persons, legally 
free, equal and bound to honour their obligations as legal persons.” Legal ideology, in 
contrast, states that “men are free and equal by nature.” In legal ideology, unlike the 
law itself, it is nature that forms the foundation of freedom, equality, and obligation. 
But regarding the latter, Althusser extends this claim by registering the existence of 
a moral ideology, reproduced in and by the ISAs, that supplements and inscribes in 
the subject a sense of moral obligation that binds individuals to the law by hailing 
them in their senses of obligation towards conscience and duty.2 The law in practice 
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is consequently an expression of the capitalist relations of production, but one that 
functions without ever mentioning them, and through the combination of the legal 
ideology and its moral supplement, the subject is interpellated as a kind of mediator 
between the inside and the outside of the legal apparatus, between the formalism of 
the law and the capitalist relations of production expressed by it in absentia. 
I want to focus here on Althusser’s theory of the subject and the way that, for 
him, the individual is interpellated as subject by ideology and particularly its moral 
supplement. The problem I have with Althusser’s formulation of the subject — a 
formulation that has received critical attention from Lacanian critical theorists 
discussed below — is that it fails to conceive or even recognize a subject who resists 
the law’s hail, when the ideological edifice begins to break down, where there is 
failed interpellation. It is precisely at the moment of the failure of interpellation, I 
claim, that the absent cause of the law — the capitalist relations of production and 
exploitation — may be able to rise to the surface in a more direct and expressive way. 
Nevertheless, I also claim that we have in recent times witnessed moments of failure 
or breach in the legal and moral ideology, where in fact such an absent cause has 
remained quite absent, instead expressing itself in symptoms like racialized violence 
and populist turns to the Right. So it is worth asking whether the moral supplement 
is enough to maintain the ideological (mis)recognition of the subject in capitalist 
relations of production. What happens when even the call of the moral supplement 
towards conscience and duty itself, begins to break down under the continuous 
revolutionary thrust of the capitalist mode of production — that is, its need to break 
down its own limits and barriers in the further pursuit of profit?
“Subject” is an ideological category for Althusser because it falls within the formal 
framework of the (liberal) legal discourse. Because the law does not distinguish 
between bourgeois and proletarian subjects, the formalism of the law and its 
application of the category of the subject produces the appearance of formal equality 
while at the same time reproducing the capitalist relations of production as its “absent 
cause.” In On the Reproduction of Capitalism, he highlights two noteworthy formal 
components of the Civil Law that make it an ally in capitalist relations of exploitation 
and in the continued reproduction of capitalism without even mentioning the 
relations of production once. First, he writes, “Law only exists as a function of the 
existing relations of production”; and, second, “Law has the form of law, that is, 
formal systematicity, only on condition that the relations of production as a function 
of which it exists are completely absent from law itself.”3 He adds in a footnote, that 
“No article of the law code, however, recognizes the fact that certain subjects (the 
capitalists) own the means of production, while others (the proletarians) have no 
means of production at all. This element (the relations of production) is accordingly 
absent from the law which, at the same time, guarantees it.”4 The law in other words, 
bourgeois law, has the effect of creating the appearance of formal equality, while at 
the same time failing to include the fact of class inequality in the form of ownership 
39Morality or Enjoyment?
of the means of production (there are some who own and some who do not), and the 
resulting relations of production (that is, the relations of exploitation). The formalism 
of the law therefore makes possible the reproduction of the capitalist relations of 
production without necessarily having to name this as its content. Legally, formally, 
everyone is entitled to own means of production; it’s just that capitalism necessarily 
requires a great many to be in the position of non-ownership, and therefore positioned 
as exploitable labor. Liberal ideology conveniently divorces the political from the 
economic. The economic mode of production becomes, in other words, the “absent 
cause” of the political-legal framework and expresses what Althusser previously (in 
Reading Capital) referred to as “structural causality.”
On the Reproduction of Capitalism provides a clearer picture of how, exactly, the 
mode of production operates as an absent cause of the legal structure, as a system that 
supports and reproduces capitalist relations of production without even naming them. 
Despite this fact, and aside from the structural absence of the mode of production 
from the form of the law, the proficiency of the law, and hence its applicability in 
the reproduction of the relations of production, requires an additional ideological 
supplement, since the law is never just the law — that is, the law can never simply 
refer to itself as its own justification.
Althusser’s approach is noteworthy because of the way that he theorizes the 
ISAs as those spaces/practices that supply an ideological supplement to the law, 
which “educates” the subject in the moral ideological support of the law. In order 
for it to function — that is, in order for it to be obeyed — the law requires an 
additional ideological supplement. Although the law can be (re-)enforced through 
violence, or through the Repressive State Apparatus, in order for any form of power 
to continuously produce and reproduce itself it cannot rely simply on the use of 
physical force. This, according to Althusser, is where the moral ideology of conscience 
and duty, of obligation towards the dictum of the legal discourse of freedom and 
equality steps in. What remains insightful about Althusser’s model is the way that 
he conceives the corresponding ISAs, which support the ideology of the state and the 
law through practices of ideological “training,” so to speak. It is in the ISAs that, for 
him, individuals are interpellated as subjects.
Interpellation and the New Theory of Structural Causality
Althusser’s theories of structural causality and ideological interpellation have 
been reworked in recent decades within the Lacanian theoretical edifice. Unlike 
the Althusserian approach, which theorizes the incorporation of the subject into 
the legal framework, the Lacanian approach asks about what happens when gaps 
in the structure become apparent and its efficacy encounters a potential moment 
of dissolution (maybe, even, “dis-illusion”). Mladen Dolar writes that, according 
to Althusser, “the subject is what makes ideology work; [whereas] for [Lacanian] 
psychoanalysis, the subject emerges where ideology fails.”5 In the Lacanian conception 
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set out by Dolar, “subject” names, not merely the agency of ideological breakdown, but 
also the moment of gap or lack in the ideological edifice. Resistance to interpellation, 
as Slavoj Žižek puts it, is the subject.5 I’d like to take Dolar’s Lacanian conception of 
the subject a step further in rethinking the relationship between the subject and 
the ISAs, particularly the question as to how the subject internalizes the moral-legal 
ideology of the apparatus that Althusser highlights in the chapter on “Law” in On 
the Reproduction of Capitalism. What appears to be missing in Althusser’s account of 
interpellation is the precipitous move on the part of the subject to resolve the deadlock 
regarding its own status — that is, towards the question of the subject’s own sense of 
certainty, of being in the world.6 
Žižek argues instead that “The first thing to do apropos of interpellation in a 
Lacanian approach is therefore to reverse Althusser’s formula of ideology which 
‘interpellates individuals as subjects’: it is never the individual which is interpellated 
as subject, into subject; it is on the contrary the subject itself who is interpellated as 
x (some specific subject-position, symbolic identity or mandate), thereby eluding 
the abyss of $ [the barred subjectivity/lack of being].”7 In this sense, interpellation 
always has a kind of anticipatory quality to it: I identify as x in order to evade the 
traumatic possibility of non-existence, or “lack.”8 I cling to the ideological discourse 
because it protects me from traumatic uncertainty regarding my status as subject. 
In the Lacanian paradigm, subjectivization does not represent an “internalization of 
the external contingency” — that is, the ideological conditioning or training of the 
subject in the ISAs — instead, ideological interpellation “resides in externalization of 
the result of an inner necessity.”9 Interpellation therefore functions because it is the 
subject who is seeking external validation, the source of which is the sublimation of 
the drive towards enjoyment. The subject clings to the source of the ideological hail 
because it allows her to reconcile her relationship to the inner tension of her desire, 
the traumatic lack that marks her as subject. “Subject,” therefore, in the Lacanian 
edifice, as the product of failed interpellation, coincides with the gap in the structure 
of the law. The emergence of the subject from failed interpellation, in this way, brings 
to the surface the absent cause of the legal structure, for example, the relations of 
exploitation in the mode of production.
Bruno Bosteels links this conception of the subject to a “new” theory of structural 
causality found in recent Lacanian inspired critical theory. In a first move, he explains 
how theorists such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, in Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy,10 argue that the social field, just like the Lacanian Symbolic order, “is 
articulated around the real of an antagonism, which resists symbolization… The 
structure is not-all: there is always a gap, a leftover, a remainder — or, if we change the 
perspective slightly, an excess, a surplus, something that sticks out. A social formation 
is not only overdetermined but constitutively incomplete.”11 Therefore, according to 
Laclau and Mouffe, “society” does not exist as a valid object of discourse. Bosteels 
adds that “The absence, or lack, of an organic society is, then, the point of the real 
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of politics.”12 It is at this point that the class struggle (the political at the heart of the 
economic mode of production) becomes recognizable as the structural impossibility 
of the social whole. Class struggle, like the Lacanian subject, emerges where society 
fails. Therefore, in a second move, Bosteels identifies this gap in the social field as the 
subject herself. “The subject ‘is’ nothing but this gap in the structure.”13 The subject, 
then, “is strictly correlative to its own impossibility,”14 or, as we saw earlier with 
Dolar, the subject emerges where ideology fails.
Finally, in the last move, ideology is identified as a fantasy formation, a supplement 
that conceals the gap or lack in the field of the social. For Žižek, this supplement is 
played by the role of enjoyment, or jouissance, which ties the subject to the surface 
level of ideological propositions — that is, the search for certainty through external 
validation. As we’ve seen, for Althusser, the supplement to ideology exists in the 
content of the moral ideology, the obligation towards conscience and duty — that is 
towards liberal assumptions about natural freedom and equality, produced in and 
through the ISAs; for Žižek, instead, it is the surplus-enjoyment produced by the 
lack or gap in the social/subject that supplements the surface level of ideological 
propositions.
The Decay of the Moral Supplement and the Obligation to Enjoy
Reflecting upon the differences between the Althusserian and the Lacanian 
conceptions of interpellation and subjectivization, I want to, in conclusion, advance 
one particular reason why the Lacanian version proposed by Dolar and Žižek might 
seem preferable in the context of twenty-first century capitalism. Partly due to Right/
liberal claims about the supposed “end of history” or the “end of ideology,” but equally 
due to a whole array of critical theory seeking to abandon the Marxist and even 
Althusserian theory of ideology, as well as the Marxist “metanarrative” of historical 
materialism — especially in the work of poststructuralist thinkers, from Foucault to 
Lyotard — it’s possible to claim that we now live in a supposedly post-ideological era. 
This is a theme expressed by Fredric Jameson’s use of Lacan’s formula for psychosis — 
as a “breakdown of the signifying chain” — to develop his theory of postmodernism. 
What such a “breakdown” registers, on the one hand, is the ongoing dissolution of 
the traditional moral supplement used in the interpellation of subjects in their moral 
obligation towards their duty, precisely under the auspices of capitalist processes 
of deterritorialization. Capitalism, and neoliberal capitalism in particular, is anti-
Oedipal in exactly the way that Deleuze and Guattari15 claimed that it was, in that it 
constantly requires the decoding and deterritorialization of tradition and the status 
quo. As Mark Fisher puts it, “capitalism brings with it a massive desacralization of 
culture. It is a system which is no longer governed by any transcendent Law; on the 
contrary, it dismantles all such codes, only to re-install them on an ad hoc basis.”16 
Capitalist processes of accumulation, production, and reproduction, are in a constant 
state of change and transformation, and therefore require the continued decoding 
42 Flisfeder
of established meanings. On the other hand, as a result of two mutually reinforcing 
discourses developed in the postwar period — the discourse of consumerism and the 
discourse of anti-Communism — the modern capitalist moral ethic of (patriarchal) 
prohibition has been transformed into the postmodern obligation towards enjoyment. 
The subject is, today, according to Žižek, interpellated by a constant injunction 
towards enjoyment. In consumer society, so we are told, there is nothing preventing 
us from fulfilling our desire for pleasure — this is also why we find moral criticisms 
against consumerism coming from the conservative Right, which it often blames for the 
disruption of the moral code. As well, we are reminded that, unlike in totalitarianism, 
as in the case of the former Soviet Union, authority will not block our access to 
enjoyment. We are, therefore, apparently free to enjoy as we please. The problem, 
however, is that, from the Lacanian perspective, the kind of enjoyment demanded is 
a structural impossibility. This is why, if we follow through with this conception of 
enjoyment, we are constantly doomed to fail. Nevertheless, the injunction towards 
obligatory enjoyment produces a surplus of libidinal energy requiring an outlet; 
it requires discharge. This rather asignifying irrational and metonymic pursuit of 
desire, like the uncertain status of the subject herself, requires external validation 
in some kind of meaningful apparatus of signification as a means of relief.
Today, we are faced with an assortment of competing signifying discourses charged 
with relieving the subject of the uncertainty with regards to her status as subject, but 
also with the discharge of surplus-enjoyment. From the more benign spaces of social 
media engagement, into which we escape to evade traumatic social existence, to more 
virulent discourses of extremism and Right-wing populism, and even now with the 
growing popularity of the so-called “alt-Right” movement in the wake of the electoral 
victory of Donald Trump, the lack of a meaningful trust in the moral code of the 
legal ideology seems to correlate with the emergence of new systems of reactionary 
subjectivity. My point, if I can put it more bluntly, is that today ideological hegemony 
is kept together less by the moral supplement towards dutiful obligation and respect 
for the legal ideology. Rather, following from the Lacanian theory of ideology, it is, I 
claim, tied up with the need to escape the traumatic confrontation with impossible 
enjoyment. Symptomatically, this means that if it is going to maintain its impact and 
strength, Althusser’s theory of ideology and the ISAs needs to be reconciled with 
neoliberal and postmodern processes of interpellation and the role of enjoyment in 
supporting and supplementing the (class) state authority and its power, in order to 
make sense of the uncertain times of the post-crisis decay of the liberal bourgeois 
sense of moral obligation towards duty and conscience, and even in defense of the 
legal ideology’s penchant towards freedom and equality.
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